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Foreword 
The Future of Cities project is informed by working papers which are commissioned by 
the Lead Expert Group and written by authors from academia and industry.  
These papers highlight the key challenges and opportunities facing cities in the UK out to 
2065. The Expert Group will draw upon this evidence base to develop project outputs 
which will be published in 2014 and 2015.   
These outputs will aim to inform near-term policy making in both local and central 
government, which achieves desirable long-term outcomes for UK cities. 
 
Professor Sir Alan Wilson
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Introduction 
In the last 50 years culture has undergone a dramatic shift in meaning and practice. In 
the post-War period a narrow social elite set dominant cultural values. The notion 
became limited to heritage, its material forms, and its conservation; the cultural realm 
was separate from the economic. Today culture is all of this and more: it is about new 
ideas, social groups and products, as well as the transformation of existing ones; it is at 
once economic and social, as well as cultural. Cultural values generally reflect a more 
diverse and democratic social composition (Marwick 1991). In this period the key term – 
culture – has undergone repeated interrogation: what is culture, what is its value, and to 
whom? Moreover, the nature and degree of these terms, and their relationships to the 
city, have changed. 
Culture is both embodied in social groups, and in places and spaces. Woven into this 
cultural transformation cities have also undergone an unprecedented phase of 
redevelopment and change the world over; arguably, the last 50 years being their most 
tumultuous, particularly with regards to culture (Hall 1998). The built form of the city is the 
stage and actor in cultural change, the ‘City Beautiful’ movement of the early twentieth 
century being a notable example (Olsen 1986).  Critically, the provision (and denial) of 
public spaces has been an important site of social and cultural demonstration that has 
challenged the regulated and enclosed prestige of buildings (Amin 2008). Such change 
does not only concern material infrastructure, but also its governance, and relationships 
with other cities and regions, nationally and internationally. 
The aim of this paper - to sketch out the possible future cultural dimension of cities - is a 
challenging task; one where culture in both its old and new forms will have a greater 
impact than has been previously evident. We preface the review of the past 50 years, 
which is sub-divided into three temporal sections, with some definitional issues regarding 
culture, the creative industries in the UK; these two parts constitute the first half of the 
paper. In broad terms, four iterations of city-culture modalities can be identified: heritage, 
cultural and creative industries, regeneration, and the experience economy. In the 
second half of the paper, arising from the review of the past, we identify five drivers of 
change likely to influence the future (education and income, migration, technology, 
governance and deindustrialisation); these constitute the platform for developing six 
scenarios of the future city and its cultural dimensions. 
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Part 1 
The cultural field 
The traditional concern of cultural policy has been with the fine arts and the conservation 
of physical artefacts of heritage. The urban fabric is, and has been since the start of the 
20th century, marked by institutions charged with this task and the imposing landmark 
status of the buildings containing them. In practice this has represented the mainly public 
patronage of the arts: music and theatre, commissioning fine art work, and preserving, 
archiving and displaying artefacts. 
Outside of these spaces, often the prime urban civic space, there lay a commercially 
orientated cultural presence, dominated by retail provision, but with a more commercial 
cultural presence: cinemas, restaurants, cafes, night clubs and bars; and beyond this 
sporting facilities are also a key aspect of urban culture; in traditional formulations this 
realm is not cultural, but commercial. Caught in between are two realms: one is public 
space, often the site of new emergent cultural expressions (Amin 2008); and the other is 
that of informal and ‘everyday’ leisure activities many of which have a strong cultural 
form. The last 50 years has been characterised by the dynamism and growth of 
production and consumption of commercial culture, and the creative industries have  
expanded through the means of music, television, and digital platforms. What marks out 
these forms is less their mark on the urban landscape, and more in the transformation of 
cultural practices in it. Creative industries now account for a significant component of 
economic output and employment in many cities, more than is generally appreciated, or 
accommodated in, urban plans. In London the creative industries represent the third 
largest sector of the workforce (Freeman 2010). Moreover, a significant indirect impact is 
also experienced by cities through the tourism and hospitality industries. Finally, the 
‘cultural offer’ of cities is increasingly utilised as a tool of city branding, to attract not only 
tourists but also foreign direct investment (El Beyrouty and Tessler 2013). Thus culture 
has been repositioned. It now plays strategic and instrumental roles, in addition to its 
traditional ones; moreover it is not ‘one’, but many, cultures and sub-cultures which are 
increasingly markers of identity. 
The cultural and creative industries 
The cultural field extends considerably beyond the concern of the Department of Culture, 
Media and Sport (DCMS)1, or the Local Authority Department of Leisure Services. Not 
only do cultural practices stretch across the formal and informal spheres, but also across 
the commercial and the non-commercial/public boundaries. Moreover, they are not 
exclusively rooted in singular places, or institutions, which government agencies regard 
as ‘cultural or creative’. Culture is also embedded in ways of life, as well as in the 
economy and the state (Williams 1989). It could be argued that this ‘messiness’ is as 
much about the rate of change in the cultural field, as the inadequacies of the analytical 
lens through which we view it (state or commercial; formal or informal; economic or 
cultural). 
1
 The Department of National Heritage (subsequently DCMS) was created in 1992. Its functions were previously 
carried out by a variety of Departments. 
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It was in 1997 that the term ‘Creative Industries’ was coined, with the establishment of 
the eponymous Task Force; the product of which was a definition, and a statistical audit: 
The Creative Industries Mapping Document (DCMS 1998)2. Prior to this the term Cultural 
Industries had been current, usage was popularised by UNESCO (Girard 1982), and it 
was deployed as a key idea in the strategies of the Metropolitan County Councils (MCC), 
notably that of the Greater London Council (GLC) Industrial Strategy (Greater London 
Council 1985). Although the usages and concepts were different, in practice the 
terminology merged and developed3. It was notable that it took until the second mapping 
document before any regional dimensions of the creative industries were registered; 
even then the role of cities was not differentiated (DCMS 2001)4. 
The dynamism of culture is disclosed through the repeated trope of the ‘culture wars’ as 
a representation of a crisis of cultural values. Across the timespan under question, one 
can identify at least six dualisms that represent such a rupture (see Box A). The original 
usage of the term culture wars  dates back to the early 1960s and the two cultures 
debate; a discussion about the tensions between science and the humanities as ways of 
seeing, and of governing, the world (Snow 1964). Although it took longer to mature and 
be articulated, the debate about high and low culture found plenty of challenges in the 
1960s. Of course this was also the ground upon which the discipline of cultural studies 
was founded, directing its concerns at ordinary culture and sub-cultures (Hebdige 1979, 
Williams 1989). If the high-low culture divide had been initially one of class, cultural 
studies opened up a dialogue relating to the post-colonial movement and migration: 
namely the debate about an emerging multi-cultural society (Gilroy 1987, Parekh 2002).  
 
Box A: 50 years of tension between culture and value 
 
high -low aesthetic 
analogue - digital 
art - science 
mono- multi-cultural 
cultural - economic value 
elite - mass culture 
classical – modern 
In the last 50 years the dominant cultural norm of society has shifted from the 
values on the left to the right of the dyadic pairs. 
Culture in the early 1960s was identified with: the classical tradition in arts and 
music, opera, literature and theatre. Popular culture, let alone ‘pop’ or modern 
traditions were less likely to appear in the cultural cannon. 
 
2
 The definition of the Creative Industries can be seen in Box D below.  
3
 The current dominant interpretation is that adopted by UNESCO Institute for Statistics (2009). Framework for Cultural 
Statistics. Paris, UNESCO. This formulation used internationally (eg UNESCO (2013). Creative economy report 2013 
special edition: widening local development pathways. Paris, UNESCO/UNDP.) extends the definition beyond 
consumption, and commercial culture to include the production system of cultural goods (tangible and intangible), as 
well as education, training, preservation and archiving. 
4
 But see Pratt1997,which showed that most creative industry jobs were urban, and within that, dominated by London. 
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More recently the reverberations of digitisation are expressive of a further divide with the 
analogue. To be sure, this is not a repeat of the same distinction; each iteration creates a 
new group of winners and losers. However, the on-going debate points to the dynamic 
and poly-inflected object that culture is: one that initially has been seen as one of 
idealism and consumption; and has expended to include materialism and cultural 
production. This is not simply an academic debate about terminology and interpretation. 
The ever-changing means of cultural production and consumption, enabled through both 
social and technological means, represents the power of culture to enable people not 
only to be resilient, but also to grow and transform. The pace of change and the 
embedding of culture at the heart of day-to-day national government have occurred quite 
recently. Culture has moved from an ‘arm’s length’ funding body and sponsored 
agencies, its position until 1992, when the Department of National Heritage was created 
as a Ministry, and in 1997 when the Minister (now named DCMS) gained a place at 
Cabinet. 
Cities 1964-2014 
Cities have continued to follow a dynamic path of growth and change: suburbanisation, 
dispersal and new towns, and inner city industrial decline and regeneration. The urban 
population of the UK continues to grow. The urban system has become decidedly more 
focused on London since the 1980s. In parallel, the pattern of governance has been 
interwoven notably with the ‘re-discovery’ of the inner cities, a response to both economic 
decline and social unrest with a significant racial dimension: the inner-city riots of 1981, 
1985, 2001, and 2011 are examples; each giving rise to considerable debate about 
culture and representation (Benyon and Solomos 1987, Solomos 2011). Overlain on this 
were the tensions between the governance powers and aspirations of the MCC5, their 
demise, and eventual re-articulation to Regional Development Agencies (RDA), and their 
eventual demise6. There are three moments when the culture and creative industries 
joined with cities to have significant impacts, all from the 1990s onwards: in the strategies 
of the MCCs, each had a cultural industries strategy; in the Regional Economic 
Strategies of the RDAs, each devoted a chapter to the creative industries; the City of 
Culture competition, elevated the cultural as a key part of urban strategies7, albeit with no 
extra resources8.  
Box B offers a conceptual map of the emergent modalities of culture, creativity and the 
city: the competing interpretations of a. the field of governance of cultural value, b. the 
city of culture, and c. the creative city. In this section we examine the historical record in 
order to review the shifting relationship of culture and the city in the last half-century 
(played out in the field represented by Box B) in order to understand its drivers. As will be 
noted, it is not simply the volume and breadth of culture that has changed in relation to 
cities, but also the location, balance of material and non-material practices, production 
and consumption, and the mix of commercial and non-commercial activities. For clarity of 
discussion, the timespan can be divided threefold: inheritance, de-industrialisation, and 
the creative industries. 
5
 1972 Local Government Act: Metropolitan County Councils: 1972-1986 
6
 1998- 2012: Regional Development Agencies Act 
7
 Established in 2009, first awarded in  2013, awarded every 4 years. 
8
 Local government funding shortfalls led one local authority, Newcastle, to cut its culture budget to zero in 2013. see 
www.theguardian.com/culture/2013/jan/29/culture-cut-arts-funding-newcastle 
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Box B: Mapping the cultural dimensions of the city: City of Culture, the 
Creative City and the field of Culture Values 
 
 
a. The governance field of cultural value 
 
b. City of Culture c. Creative City 
1. Tourism and Experience 
2. Heritage and preservation 
3. The arts 
4. City beautiful, the designed and 
planned city of culture 
5. The intercultural city, city of multiple 
cultural communities 
1. Creative decision making and 
governance 
2. Mobilisation of youth, cultural politics 
3. Place marketing, attracting 
investment 
4. Industrial strategy 
a. cultural quarters 
b. cultural industry policy 
 
 
Inheritance (1960s-1970s) 
Culture and the city in the early 1960s was to a large extent the legacy of Victorian 
philanthropists and early 20th Century municipal endeavours (Briggs 1971). In both 
cases major cultural buildings were raised to celebrate and advertise culture as an 
integral part of the city above and beyond a mercantile or functional civic base. The 
municipal buildings of the Town Hall would usually be joined in close proximity by a 
museum, an art gallery, library, theatre and concert hall. Thus the principal markers of 
culture, occupied pride of place in the civic, predominantly non-commercial, heart of the 
city. This was a defining characteristic of many cities and their urban cultures; cultural 
values appeared to be settled. 
9 
The buildings of the civic precinct contained cultural institutions, which performed the role 
of educating and informing citizens of what was, for most, an uncontested and shared 
cultural heritage that was founded on high culture. The exception to this norm was the 
presence of a significant number of cinemas located in the core retail area, as well as 
outer urban, and suburban centres. Beyond this lay a significant field of the ‘ordinary’ 
cultural activities carried out in self-organised groups in the community9. 
Urban growth and redevelopment was initially concentrated in the continued post-war 
suburbanisation and second wave New Town developments. The traditional townscape 
began to change further as a result of the changing organisation of retailing exemplified 
by the supermarket10 and the chain store. Due to floor space requirements new building 
was required and with it a novel urban form emerged: the shopping centre and arcade11. 
A further iteration responded to increasing car ownership: namely the emergence of the 
out of town shopping centre, initially for DIY stores, and then later for weekly food 
shopping.  The car and the out of town shopping centre impacted significantly on the 
traditional city core in terms of decreased footfall, and increased vacancy rates; the net 
result was a sharp decline of the high street and traditional shops; critically, the cultural 
life of the city was eroded. Mindful of this threat, there was much opposition in the form of 
planning regulations: in the end, to little effect. 
There was concern that the domination of chain store retailers, and a small number of 
mall developers, was leading to a dramatic fall in diversity of retail offer even in new 
shopping centres, and of the urban experience12. Culturally, there was also concern with 
the changing character of the high street; an aspect of urban cultural conviviality and 
pride was lost from many city centres. As city centres suffered decline, public cultural 
facilities were, in effect, in the wrong location and in older and less suitable buildings that 
made it more difficult to adapt to patterns of visitor demand (a shopping demand which 
was becoming participatory and interactive, compared to the previous norm of passive 
and receptive customers): the result of an economic reconfiguration, but one with 
profound cultural impacts. 
Culture in the early 1960s, as noted above, was generally characterised as a consensual 
focus on high culture; however, new and emergent forms increasingly challenged this, 
not just cinema, which was by then an accepted new form, but especially by popular 
music venues. Local and regional popular music cultures arose, notably in the larger 
cities, starting with Liverpool13. It was not just live music, but also dance too; Northern 
Soul, again rooted in the North West conurbation, being a particular case in point. With 
the emergence of popular television much entertainment became home-centred; this had 
a significant knock-on effect in the urban realm: cinema audiences collapsed (UK Film 
Council 2002), cinemas closed, and the number of urban pubs steadily declined14. 
Commentators pointed to the emergence of a more individualised and isolated cultural 
lifestyle where informal, community and voluntary aspects were undermined15. 
9
 This cultural inheritance is captured in texts such as Hoggart (1957)  and Williams, R. (1989).  
10
 The first Supermarket in the UK opened in 1951; but significant growth occurred from 1960s onward. 
11
 Birmingham Bull Ring Shopping centre was the first indoor shopping centre in the UK, 1964 
12
 http://oxford-institute.sbsblogs.co.uk/2013/07/19/diversity-and-the-uks-high-streets/ 
13
 In the 1970s and 1980s the music epicentre shifted to the West Midlands, for Heavy Metal, and subsequently Ska; 
returning to Sheffield, Manchester and Liverpool in the 1990s. Throughout this time London remained the focus of 
recording, marketing and management, as well as the biggest audiences. 
14
 The number of pubs declined by 28% between 1982-2012 www.beerandpub.com/statistics 
15
 A classic statement – written about the US – that sparked debate in the UK was Putnam, R. D. (2000). "Bowling 
alone : the collapse and revival of American community." 541 p. 
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UK cities were on a downward trajectory with respect to their traditional cultural offering; 
where (novel) cultural activity was growing, it was in re-purposed commercial cultural 
urban environments, such as pubs and nightclubs. The period of the 1970s saw the 
continuation of the post-war decline of cinema audiences; and another stalwart of the city 
centre, the cinema, moved to decay and decline. Smaller cinemas closed, or were 
converted into bingo halls; larger ones were closed or sub-divided into multiscreen 
cinemas in order to compete with the edge-of-town cinemas (UK Film Council 2002). 
Migration to cities resulted in the emergence of ethnic restaurants in many of them16. The 
popularity of these signalled a change in (what had until then) been a very conservative 
national food culture, as well as a greater propensity to ‘eat out’ (or at least not to prepare 
food at home)17; a trend that has gathered pace ever since. 
A sign of the times was that in the late 1960s the National Trust board was challenged for 
its exclusive focus on the preservation of grand houses and stately homes. Likewise, the 
Arts Council of Great Britain was under pressure to respond to a changing society and 
polity18. For example, the 1965 ‘Policy for the arts’ signalled both a tentative recognition 
of popular culture, and a decentralisation of its provision (Hewison 1995). 
It is notable that the conception of protected and preserved buildings and sites also 
changed, admitting modern  and industrial architecture. So much so, that by the early 
1980’s commentators noted a strand of national, or policy, obsession with a 
(romanticised) old country (Hewison 1987). The event of the 1970s and 1980s - the 
deindustrialisation of the Northern cities - provided one possible reason for people to take 
comfort in (an idealised) past, as had also happen at the dawn of the 20th century 
(Weiner 2004). 
De-industrialisation (mid 1970s-late 1990s) 
The period from the mid-1970s and late-1980s was one of national economic decline, 
experienced particularly in the Northern regions, an exposure to internationalisation and 
competition for inward investment as manufacturing industry declined or was relocated 
abroad. This had a massive impact in terms of a transformation of the industrial base of 
most cities outside of London and the South East, whose employment had until then 
relied on manufacturing. That manufacturing which remained was transformed, a 
condition of that transformation was invariably production reorganisation, that meant that 
the demand on industrial premises, which had been a main stay of the industrial 
heartland of cities, was quickly vacated leaving behind physical and social dereliction.  
Governments began to realise that there was an ‘inner city problem’ which would not 
simply go away without direct action. London was rather an exception, it suffered 
massive manufacturing loss, but in gross terms these jobs were replaced with the surge 
of growth in financial services (Pratt 1994). Whilst overall jobs were stable in London, 
unemployment still grew as those migrating from the regions, or outer London, added to 
the labour supply.  
The cities of the North and their regions took longer to recover, and this had a significant 
impact and legacy on their urban landscapes (many dominated by manufacturing and 
16
 As an example the number of ‘Indian’ restaurants in 1960 was 500; by 2011 9400 
www.fedrest.com/marketresearch.htm 
17
 Average spend per person per week on eating out, out of total food spend, was 26% in 2005 compared to less than 
10% in 1955. see www.defra.gov.uk/statistics/files/ defra-stats-food-family-annual-2009/pdf 
18
 Driven by international in-migration, increased access to higher education, and higher standards of living (see 
below). 
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warehousing buildings now unused). For most cities the economic decline of the 1970s 
and 1980s compounded an already declining city centre, and one for which the cultural 
offering was either out of date, or not frequented by the population. Significant attempts 
were made to draw consumers back to the centre, with large-scale urban retail 
remodelling, for example the Arndale Shopping centre in Manchester19. The scale of 
such developments both reconfigured public and private space, and was one 
representation of cultural values in the city, just as the town halls and galleries of the 
previous century had been. 
Many cities initiated physical regeneration schemes of once industrial land supported by 
European Regional Development Funds, which were available for many depressed 
regions at the time. A popular theme was to have waterfront development schemes for 
offices and residential uses, but driven by a cultural theme (Loftman and Nevin 1995). 
This drew on an emergent Northern European experience of culture-led urban 
regeneration at the time (Bianchini and Parkinson 1993). 
Public cultural institutions were often limited in their capacity to change, in one part by 
falling tax income and limited autonomy from the nation state, and in the other part by the 
burden of the upkeep of buildings unsuitable for the changes that were overtaking 
cultural institutions such as museums and galleries: an active engagement with 
audiences, and an attempt to reach out from the gallery space, and to connect with 
community interests (Vergo 1989).  One resolution of this tension was resolved by the 
rising popularity of industrial archaeology and museums. These provided a 
counterbalance to the socially and physically remote stately home model that had 
previously dominated physical heritage sites.  
Alongside this, cultural industries strategies were developed by the MCCs (until their 
abolition in 1986). The pioneer was Sheffield, rooting its cultural industries regeneration 
in a solution to youth unemployment and local economic development20. Thus, the 
foundations were set for polices focused on the cultural industries, alongside the arts and 
heritage. These programmes were operated under planning and local economic 
development budgets, in contrast to those of the arts and leisure which catered for 
heritage, libraries and museums. 
The transformation of culture begun in the 1960s developed further with an upsurge in 
community arts practice and a growing recognition of the importance, and relative neglect 
of, culture for marginalised groups (representing ‘new’ migrants, and the poor). Central 
government attention shifted to the cities seeking to link culture and economic 
revitalisation. ‘Garden Festivals’ were a pioneering example of urban regeneration 
supported by central government, beginning with the Liverpool Garden Festival in 
198421. In 1988 the Arts Council produced its ‘Action for Cities’, which was indicative of a 
shift occurring toward instrumentalism: henceforth arts and culture would lead 
regeneration.  
19
 When it was built in the 1970s it was the largest of its kind in Europe. 
20
 A definitive statement of such policies was Greater London Council. (1985). 
21
 Others were held in Stoke, Glasgow, Gateshead, and Ebbw Vale 
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 Box C: Funding balance of projects of Heritage Lottery Fund 1994-2012 
 
Source: Heritage Lottery Fund Strategic Framework 2013-18 
 
In the same year Tate Liverpool opened, an example of the decentralisation of national 
cultural institutions, as part of a plan to regenerate the Liverpool dock area; a further 
satellite of the Tate opened in St Ives in 1993. This signalled a trend of provincial 
resurgence in gallery and museum building22, reaching its apogee after the millennium, 
and significantly aided by the 1993 National Lottery Act23; an indicative balance of 
funding on projects is shown in Box C. In this period there has been a significant 
investment in flagship developments of new cultural infrastructure, in the case of major 
libraries and concert halls funded by local authorities (see Box E below)24. 
The notion of the temporary festival, such as the Garden Festival, also can be seen in the 
European City of Culture (ECOC) idea, which in its pioneering 1990 Glasgow incarnation 
became a significant vehicle for civic pride, marketing and industrial transformation. 
There have been many interpretations of the significance of this new approach to the 
ECOC scheme (Palmer-Rae Associates 2004) in places not previously noted as a high 
cultural destination. Whilst there is disagreement about the success for Glasgow, and 
whether the impact was solely due to ECOC, most agree that it opened the door to a new 
strategy of mixing of culture and regeneration (Booth and Boyle 1993). 
As noted above, a significant shift in the physical form and changing function of the city 
centre has been the growth of the out-of-town shopping centre, and the inner city 
enclosed mall. These developments have invariably removed a large proportion of retail 
13 
                                            
22
 Bradford’s National Film and Television museum (1983), and the Royal Armouries Leeds (1996) were early 
examples. 
23
 It would be instructive to see the proportional balance of cultural funding in the UK over time. However, the 
fragmented nature of these funding streams, their shifting targets and sponsors makes such a task formidable. See 
Casey, B.,  et al  (1996). , Selwood, S. and G. Brown (2001). 
24
 Notably Birmingham used its orchestra to project the city to the world. 
activity from the city centre25. Moreover, in-city malls have often effectively privatised 
what were once public streets; effectively extracting significant parts of the city from the 
common circulation space thereby changing the cultural experience. In part the ‘new 
enclosures’ were a response to a town centre management concern, to make the city 
centre safe and attractive. The almost universal presence of closed circuit television 
cameras has been one way to address the law and order issue26, however, it also raises 
issues of civil liberties. Another idea was  what became in many cases an aggressive 
drinking culture of the city centre, could be diffused by a more relaxed ‘open all hours’ 
city centre (Bianchini 1995, Heath 1997). City centres have become a mecca for the 
larger pub, the coffee shop, and fast food outlet. Drinking and eating has become the 
object of a city visit in itself rather than shopping. Such changes represent a profound 
contrast with the heavily regulated retail and entertainment culture up until 1994, where 
rigid closing times, and Sunday trading restrictions were maintained. 
A trend throughout the last half-century has been the increase of tourism, both inward 
and outward27. The latter has an impact on the expectations of the host-population to try 
a wider range of cultural experiences (adding to that already prompted by in-migration). 
The former is a significant market opportunity. London is always going to benefit the most 
as its national institutions attract the best audiences; however, it also puts a significant 
cost on the necessary regular upgrading to facilities. Perhaps the best example of a new 
trend has been Tate Modern: this captured a significant change in trend that was forward, 
and not backward, looking by showcasing modern art, in a consciously cosmopolitan and 
multicultural outlook, in an old industrial building (Leonard 1997). 
The international pressure to maintain competitive advantage leads to a shorter turnover 
time between refurbishment, and this becomes an added challenge that opens up a gap 
between second and third tier cities The 1990s marked a significant change in the post-
war architecture profession. The reputation and visibility of architecture, and British 
architects, became very successful globally in this period, key developments such as 
major new offices, high-rise buildings, and airports, galleries and concert halls provided 
the canvas upon which to advertise a new architectural confidence. However, it was only 
in the 2000s that these architects got to build their structures in the UK. 
The Creative Industries and the Heritage Lottery Fund (late 1990s onward) 
Following on from the emerging trends from the early 1990s central government turned to 
focus on the economic impact of the arts, and alternate funding sources (and less money 
from the state). The headline change was the focus on the Creative Industries, a new 
concept (see Box D) that had its focus on the exploitation of intellectual rights and 
economic earnings. Although they were only available at the national scale, the 
accompanying ‘Mapping Document’ provided economic data that the creative industries 
could contribute directly to economic growth and jobs. Whilst it generated much publicity, 
little substantive policy flowed from it. It took until the second mapping document in 2001 
to include an appendix on regional creative industries, but still nothing on the urban. 
Subsequent analyses have shown that 40% of all employment in the creative industries 
25
 See British Council of Shopping Centres (2006).  In the early 1960s there were no ‘out of town’ developments, now 
60% of floor space is located out of town. It will require a massive regulatory change to slow, let alone turn around, this 
trend. 
26
 The first town, Kings Lynn adopted the technology in 1987. There was a huge growth in the application of CCTV to 
town centres in the 1990s. By 1995 200 town centres had them fitted. See Graham, S., J. Brooks and D. Heery (1995), 
Visit Britain (2014). 
27
 National statistics (1999). Visit_Britain (2014).  
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is in the major conurbations, and 24% of UK employment in the creative industries in 
London alone (Pratt 1997). 
 
Box D: The Creative Industries 
 
The DCMS introduced the notion of the creative industries in 1998 defined as 
 
"Those industries which have their origin in individual creativity, skill and talent 
and which have a potential for wealth and job creation through the generation 
and exploitation of intellectual property"  
 
The industries were identified as: 
 
1. Advertising 
2. Architecture 
3. Arts and antique markets 
4. Crafts 
5. Design 
6. Designer fashion 
7. Film, video 
8. Interactive leisure software 
9. Music 
10. Performing arts 
11. Publishing 
12. Television 
13. Radio 
 
 
The establishment of the RDAs  (1998-2012), and in particular the preparation of 
Regional Economic Strategies, required the audit and measurement of the creative 
industries, as well as investment in them. Hence, the cultural industries strategies of the 
MCC were revisited as the RDAs looked for industrial strategy ideas. This led to action 
on the ground in all the larger cities. Venture capital funds, and creative clusters were 
initiated by local public agencies in many urban locations; the latter much influenced by 
the Industrial Clusters report that stressed the future possibilities of new media in 
particular as a source of regional growth (DTI 2001). Plans were also made for training 
and education in relationship to the creative industries. As long ago as 1994 Sheffield 
had begun a strategy of developing ‘Cultural Industry Quarters’: dedicated provision of 
business advice and incubator space to co-locate new cultural and creative businesses. 
Cultural Industry Quarters, or Clusters as they subsequently were known, which were 
developed by most MCC, received validation in the DTI report noted above. The other 
new administrative component of the policy framework were the Regional Cultural 
Consortia, which  were meant to link with the arts and cultural community, but  had 
significantly less resource, and less impact. 
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 Box E: A selection of New Galleries and Museums 
 
Tate Liverpool, 1988 
Tate St Ives 1993 
Royal Armouries Leeds ,1996 
The Lowry, Manchester 1999 
Walsall Art Gallery, 2000 
Tate Modern, London 2000 
Imperial War Museum North, Manchester 2002 
The Baltic, Gateshead 2002 
The Sage, Gateshead 2004 
The Public, West Bromwich 2010 
Turner, Margate 2011 
Hepworth Gallery, Wakefield 2011 
 
 
A more visible appearance of (traditional) culture in the city emerged as a result of the 
availability of funds from the Lottery, the time-lag of investment planning and building, 
and the approaching millennium delivered many new galleries and museums (Box E); 
predominately outside London. The 2001 free admission policies and the new building 
programme boosted the popularity of museums, and crucially their visitor numbers. Tate 
Modern was perhaps the jewel in the crown given its success with visitors and cultural 
statement of a modern and cosmopolitan nation. The record of these new galleries and 
museums has been mostly good, and some excellent, but there have been some notable 
failures28. However, despite the increasingly ‘crowded market’ of new museums, visitor 
numbers have continued to rise29. 
Thus, the huge boost in the creative industries (in profile, but also in terms of economic 
output), as well as the new cultural infrastructure boosted by the Lottery funds, marked a 
significant renaissance that has had an impact on cities in the form of new buildings, a 
renewed cultural confidence, and recognition of the part that culture and creativity may 
play in it. Connecting the existing infrastructure and melding it with these new 
circumstances has been a challenge. The first steps were laid out by the Urban Task 
Force (1999) which strengthened an existing trend of brown-filed development, and 
critically, mixed use development. The latter was viewed as the key to resolving social, 
economic and environmental tension by reducing the travel to work distances. It also help 
to promote the re-population of cities based on the idea of the attraction of cultural 
activities and ‘live-work’ paces. This, it hoped, would create the conditions for a 
renaissance of urban living, especially for a younger population30 that was both culturally 
vibrant and environmentally sustainable.  
28
 Several galleries have struggled, but the most high profile failure has been The Public in West Bromwich (2010-
2013) 
29
 Between 2000-2010 visitor numbers increased by 51%. National Museum Directors Council (2011).  
www.nationalmuseums.org.uk/what-we-do/encouraging_investment/free-admission/  
30
 Indicative are the projects of developers such as Urban Splash that have focused on this type of  project (eg New 
Islington, Manchester). 
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This concept was given a major boost by the writings of Richard Florida (2002) who 
argued that cities that invested in both a high quality environment and contemporary 
cultural facilities that appealed to the ‘creative class’ would attract this group of workers 
to them. The critical fact that Florida revealed was that the ‘creative class’ was in demand 
by high growth/high technology industry, and thus such a strategy would attract these 
industries and jobs to their cities (hence reversing the trend of workers following jobs), as 
well as investing in culture and the environment. Not surprisingly, the idea was very 
popular. 
Florida’s ideas were taken up in the UK as well, but they underwent a transformation as 
they confronted the home-grown cultural industries model, and both rubbed up against a 
more traditional cultural heritage approach (Pratt 2010). The result was a rather 
confusing mix of approaches and rationales, but the overriding point was that cities - 
aside from London – generally lacked the strategic capabilities or resources from the 
mid-2000’s onwards to offer a strong creative/cultural strategy. 
Another challenge to the creative class thesis was the real contradiction between an idea 
of tolerance and diversity and the real life experience. The inner city riots of 2001 and 
2011 gave pause to the notion that all groups were benefitting from the brave new world 
of the creative city. In parallel, those from the traditional arts and cultural establishment 
objected to the commercial nature of the culture provided in this new model of the city. 
From both, albeit different, perspectives there was a persistent question of just how 
inclusive the creative city vision was (Pratt 2011). 
The investment in major cultural events such as the 2012 Olympics and the 2000 
Millennium Dome give a distinctly urban focus. However, these were characterised by 
their temporary nature, as well as their ‘legacy’ regeneration function (similar to the 
Garden Festivals). The ECOC award to Liverpool was another example of a temporary 
festival. Following in Glasgow’s footsteps, Liverpool gained the title of the UK’s latest 
ECOC in 200831. The lesson learned this time was that the competitor cities (within the 
UK) were judged to have gained significantly from the bidding process, notably 
Newcastle32. The celebration of identity and the local negotiation of a shared local 
cultural heritage was perceived to be a significant (unintended) outcome. In part this was 
the stimulus for the UK to set up its own National City of Culture competition on a four-
year cycle, the first was awarded to Derry/Londonderry (2013), and will be hosted by Hull 
in 2017. 
The revolution of retailing associated with the growth of online shopping had dealt 
another blow to the traditional city core. It was clear that retailing alone would not retain 
customers; thus the emergence of two related themes. The first sought to capitalise on 
the ‘experience’ of the city (Pine II and Gilmore 1999, that is what face-to-face contact in 
the city offered as a premium beyond online shopping. Thus trends in urban animation, 
buskers and street theatre, are employed by town centre managers to attract people 
back to the centre, and to compete with other centres and out of town centres33. There 
31
 The ECOC has been subjected to extensive monitoring and evaluation; although conclusions are difficult to draw as 
the aims and objectives are different each time. In this sense Liverpool was significant in that it sought (for the first 
time) to create a pre- and post- event evaluation. See Garcia, B., R. Melville and T. Cox (2010). .  
32
 We can add to this the bidding process for sports events; Manchester’s bid for the 2000 Olympic games for example; 
the successful bid, but less successful outcome, of the Sheffield Student Games (1991), but the success of the 
Edinburgh Commonwealth Games (1986), and the Glasgow Commonwealth Games (2014) 
33
 Pioneered in Brent Cross in London 1976, the out of tradition city centre retail mall continued to grow, notable 
developments (above 140,000ft2) being London’s Bluewater and Lakeside, Sheffield’s, Meddowhall and Manchester’s, 
Trafford, and Merry Hill, Dudley. See www.retail-week.com/property/top-100-shopping-centres/  
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has also been recognition of the importance of public spaces, often graced with a major 
piece of specially commissioned public art. 
City centres have struggled against on one hand the bland repetition of the same chain 
stores, and on the other hand, the infill of charity shops and banks. One growth area has 
been a general increase in restaurants and eating establishments in cities. Food culture, 
especially a diverse range of ethnically themed restaurants, in addition street food and 
farmers’ markets has been a major transformation of city life. Additionally the growth of 
specialist cultural quarters: these are physical clusters of   boutique craft and specialist 
retail activities, with some small-scale cultural production on site located in ‘heritage’ 
areas of inner cities34. It is important to distinguish these from ‘creative clusters’ or 
cultural production quarters (see above). These are usually focused on the provision of 
incubator units for creative micro-enterprises35. A variant are the artist studio complexes 
that have emerged in London managed by Space, and in many cities elsewhere in 
England and Scotland operated by agencies such as Acme. The resurgence of artists’ 
studios and workplaces has become a significant entrant into many inner cities, their 
presence is often picked up as the first signs of gentrification and turnaround a process 
which invariably leads to the expulsion of the artists due to rising rents (Pratt 2009). 
Another effect of the transformation of the Creative Industries has been that associated 
with broadcasting, especially the BBC. Digitisation has given rise to re-organisation of 
broadcasting around functions (news, sport, drama) rather than technologies (radio, TV). 
The BBC has relocated a substantial part of its organisation in Salford, and Bristol, as 
well as other national hubs such as Glasgow and Cardiff. The whole nature of 
broadcasting has changed; commissioning is now the main function, not broadcasting, 
today much programme making is competitively outsourced. Not surprisingly, 
independent production companies still cluster close to the commissioning hubs. 
Film has also undergone a significant change, whilst public support continues it has been 
the commercial aspects that have been drivers. London has developed as a world leader 
in film special effects; as film is mainly ‘enhanced’ today, this is big business. A micro-
cluster, but of international significance exists in Soho. An important ‘offshoot’ is Bristol, 
home of an animation cluster linked to Aardman Animation, and the BBC Natural History 
Unit. A new industry, computer games, has also developed clusters; but for 
organisational reasons peculiar to games production these clusters are predominately 
non-inner city36. 
Other creative industries, such as music and publishing, have retreated to London, 
Manchester and Glasgow-Edinburgh. The newspaper industry has also suffered decline, 
its traditional location in London is now as much dictated by cheap office space, as they 
are no longer linked to printing presses which are now dispersed closer to customers. 
Theatre and opera, perhaps, because they offer a live experience, have survived. 
However, regional theatre struggles and undoubtedly will continue to do so. Experiments 
such as NT live have demonstrated that digital representation is viable. However, whilst it 
provides access to audiences, the challenge of reversing decline in audiences (and 
particularly their narrow, aging, demographic) remains (Bakhshi, et al. 2010). 
34
 Nottingham’s Lace Market; Manchester’s Northern Quarter, Brighton’s Lanes. 
35
 Examples, amongst many are: the Chocolate Factory, Wood Green; The Custard Factory, Birmingham; The media 
centre, Huddersfield; the Lighthouse, Brighton (and Wolverhampton), the Watershed, Bristol. 
36
 Leamington Spa, Dundee, Warrington, Derby Guildford, and Teeside are examples. 
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The most significant marker of urban culture in recent years has been the austerity 
measures that have led to much reduced public funding, notably at the local scale 
(associated with libraries, and local museums)(Pratt and Hutton 2013). The smallest 
museums, which were mainly sustained through volunteering, have been able to survive; 
the largest museums and galleries have been in part protected, but are also in a good 
position to attract sponsorship. The middle-size museums and galleries, particularly 
those in the major cities outside London suffered most in this period. Volunteering cannot 
fill the gap; and sponsorship is much harder to attract.  
Although it is not strictly urban in form, a notable growth of the cultural phenomenon of 
festivals has been significant in the last 20 years37. The festivals are part of the urban 
system, they comprise urban residents and resources; they are in effect ‘pop up’ cities: 
music festivals such as Glastonbury now attract 135,000 visitors. The occurrence is not 
confined to popular music, there has also been a significant growth in festivals for 
literature, performance and science: the most successful in recent years38 being Hay-on-
Wye, Edinburgh and Cheltenham , which all now attract considerable corporate and 
media sponsorship39.
37
 For example, in the summer of 2013, there were over 160 popular music festivals in the UK see Leyshon, A. (2014).  
38
 All of these festivals have run for a long time, the oldest being Edinburgh, starting in 1947. 
39
 Sponsorship has become an increasingly significant source of cultural funding in recent years see Arts and Business 
(2009).  
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Part 2 
Drivers of change 
Reflecting upon the last 50 years we can identify five drivers of change in the cultural 
field, (see figure 1). They all interact with wider economic change and urban development 
not covered here. These drivers are mobilised by changing inputs: demographic 
changes, technological, and internationalisation; as well as the politics and governance 
of the cultural sector. The results of these drivers are a range of cultural forms and 
experiences.  
Figure 1: the five drivers of cultural change 
 
Figure 2: the three stressors of cultural change 
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These can be described in three dimensions (see figure 2). First, the breadth of culture 
extending beyond classical culture and heritage to the creative industries, tourism and 
consumption, an experience increasingly delivered at least in part via a digital platform. 
Some commentators see a shift towards an ‘ominivore’ cultural consumption where the 
range of cultural participation expands, effacing the old divisions. Second, the abiding 
concern of cultural agencies is with conservation and preservation; however, two new 
aspects of culture have emerged as critical: cultural participation and access, and cultural 
production. Finally, contemporary culture is globalised in the sense of the mixing of many 
new cultural forms, but also the UK has gained a significant reputation for pioneering 
cultural innovation (Landry 2000, Landry 2006, Wood and Landry 2007). We now review 
the five major drivers of change that we expect to play a significant role in the next half 
century. 
Education and income 
A key component of cultural change is education. Obviously, knowledge of culture gained 
in education is important and extends the depth and breadth of cultural appreciation. 
Education is also significant because extended participation (as a result of the rising 
school leaving age which occurred in 1972 (14-16 years) and 2013 (16-18 years), as well 
as the increasing participation in higher education, from the 1960s, but especially in the 
2000s) delays family formation and an extension of leisure time and the relative freedom 
to engage in cultural activities. Moreover, growth of the birth rate in the post war-period 
created a powerful force in the economy.  
In the 1960s, this process was further boosted by rising wealth and disposable income 
for younger persons. These two trends created the foundation for a rise in consumption 
associated with teenage fashion, mainly mobilised around music and clothing; this trend 
has continued, despite intervening recessions40. The particularly short trend cycle of 
music and clothing feeds even more consumption (as the ‘turnover rate’ increases). This 
is one of the motors of the economic expansion of the creative industries. This process 
has been driven onward by the extension of cultural consumption by the ‘baby boomers’ 
beyond teenager-hood, into middle and increasingly older age (Young 2002). 
A consequence is that the ‘popular culture’ consumption demographic is increasingly 
encompassing all age groups. Furthermore, the impact of higher educational 
achievement, associated with increasingly discerning cultural consumption, will also work 
its way through the population. Participation in higher education was around 5% in the 
early 1960s, it is closer to 45% today41. Female participation in the labour market has 
now exceeded that of men, as has higher education participation. It is clear that the white 
male norms of the cultural field will be challenged in terms of gender, class and ethnicity, 
and that this trend will intensify rather than wane. 
However, the inheritance of the expansion of higher education (or rather the mode of 
financing it) will result in the current cohort, and those that follow, carrying considerably 
more debt from that education, and the ever-increasing costs of housing, through to 
middle and older age. Inevitably, this will set limits on consumption. Furthermore, working 
ages are increasing and pension values declining. In the median term cultural 
40
 Spending on leisure goods and services now accounts for 18% of all household expenditure, up by 7% compared to 
household leisure spending in 1953. In the early-1950s, broadcasting was confined to three BBC radio stations and 
just one monochrome BBC television channel. Cinema attendance was 10 times higher in the early 1950s than it is 
today, although recently attendance levels have begun to improve. Young, R. (2002).  
41
 The number of students proceeding on to higher education has risen ten-fold over the last half century. In 2001, 
there were 2 million students in full- or part-time higher education, compared with just 220,000 in the mid-1950s. The 
UK had around 20 universities in 1950, compared with over 90 in 2002 .Ibid. 
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consumption will continue to rise; and as a consequence in 25 years or so it will be 
expected to plateau. 
Migration 
A second aspect of demographic change that began in the 1950s is immigration. The first 
post-war migration groups were encouraged to fill labour market gaps: they hailed 
primarily from the Caribbean. Political refugees drove subsequent migration from East 
Africa and the Indian sub-continent. Later movements especially in the 2000s have been 
motivated by economic (push) factors; notably eastern European migrants. To this can 
be added a global flow of in-migrants attracted to the UK, many of them highly skilled, 
and in highly paid professions. Settlement of immigrants has been dominantly urban in 
character. 
Immigration in the pre-millennium period was particularly significant in that it involved 
large numbers of families arriving in a relatively short period and settling permanently. 
Moreover, settlement was highly concentrated in a small number of cities; there has been 
a politically negative response by some portions of the population. Immigration has 
challenged the dominant mono-culturalist and assimilationist modes of the past. After 
considerable social struggle, a period of multiculturalism was ushered in and cultural 
institutions were transformed to support cultural diversity. Those cities with significant 
immigrant populations, especially as they became second generation, native born, 
commonly questioned the failure to see their cultural traditions and histories reflected in 
public and municipal culture. The local public celebrations of various ethnic groups are a 
representation of this change (for example: Chinese New Year, Diwali and Eid). The 
subsequent transformation has added a further nuance to the balance between heritage 
and change in the field of culture, as well as for whom, and how, it represents that 
culture. It is this process that will continue to shape what we mean by culture and 
heritage in the future. 
Although the political debate focuses on arrivals, and net migration, the overlooked fact is 
that there is a large through flow of population bringing knowledge and expertise, and 
culture to the UK, and vice versa, higher education can be particularly highlighted here as 
a gateway to cities outside the capital; although London remains most popular. It seems 
unlikely that this pattern will change, and even if new settlement were prohibited as more 
extreme political actors threaten, the current mix of population would remain with us. It is 
a demographic fact that Britain is, and will stay, multicultural. The next 50 years will see 
the consequences as they work themselves through culture, economy and society will 
only get more profound as time goes on. The notion of ‘plural cities’ where no one group 
has majority describes a handful of cities today; it will be most cities by the mid twenty-
first century42.  
Even the temporary mobility of people, for instance as tourists, has important cultural 
implications. The rise in foreign travel has changed the taste and cultural tolerance of the 
UK population (as evidenced by the acceptance of multi-culturalism, and the embrace of 
diverse media, fashions and cuisines)43. This will undoubtedly continue as travel costs 
42
 Joseph Rowntree Foundation (2013): The Dynamics of Diversity: evidence from the 2011 Census: Does Britain have 
plural cities? www.ethnicity.ac.uk/research/outputs/briefings/dynamics-of-diversity/  
43
 The average British household in the 1950s could afford, at most, only one family holiday per year, and the vast 
majority tended to be spent in the UK at holiday camps, hotels and small guesthouses. In 2000, UK residents made 37 
million holiday trips to European or inter-continental destinations, spending over £15 billion. Office for National 
Statistics International Passenger Survey (2000); Travel Trends (2001)  
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continue to fall, in spite of concerns about the environmental costs. In parallel, we see a 
rise in cultural tensions in cities expressed as racism, but also through a resistance to 
difference. A programme of engagement with such cultural differences underpins one 
strand of emergent cultural policy, seeking to achieve mutual understanding (Wood and 
Landry 2007). It has been argued that in so doing cultural diversity, rather than being a 
state of stress, can be transformed into an asset. 
Incoming tourists are increasingly significant, not only adding to diversity, but economic 
growth. The spend-per-visit has increased dramatically in recent years, especially from 
Chinese visitors44. Much of the tourism is urban based, and often around shopping, as 
well as counter balanced by a continuing concern with heritage. 
Technology 
The most obvious changes, especially in the cultural industries, seem to have been 
wrought by technology: mass reproduction and digitisation to give two obvious examples. 
However, we need to be very cautious about ‘reading off’ cultural change from 
technologies: technologies enable, societies transform cultures. Organisational and 
regulatory forces can shape, or sidestep, the potential impact of technologies.  
The transformation of technology has had relatively little direct impact on the heritage 
sector, but a massive transformative effect for the creative industries. The fundamental 
transformation of music from live to recorded music and its popular consumption had 
manifest impacts. The business model of music, like that of any publishing, is based 
upon the ability to secure a growing rent from a single product, a record; the returns to 
scale are enormous. Furthermore, popular music forms that were international enabled 
even great profits to be made extending markets outside of the UK. In the 2000s the 
transformation of digitisation destabilised this particular model of distribution and 
business form in the creative industries. However, although the transformation was 
difficult for some, and led to a restructuring of the industries, overall creative industries 
consumption has continued to grow, indeed, it has proliferated, converged and hybridised 
into many new forms. The changes afforded by new technologies have affected the way 
we spend our leisure time. Mass TV arrived in the living room in the 1960s; TV has 
consistently taken on average 3 hours of our time each day; since the 1960s film 
attendance has collapsed. The rise of mobile computing and social media now exceeds 
even the time investment of TV, although both activities are increasingly carried out at 
once. Moreover, newspaper reading has declined in the last 30 years, from 72% to 
45%45. Clearly, with only 24 hours in a day, the impact of other leisure and cultural 
activities will become apparent. 
The issues that are emergent with current technological-regulatory changes that will have 
lasting significance concerns the mass customisation of services based upon personal 
data characteristics. On one hand this is opening new markets, on the other hand it is 
causing considerable social and political concerns about privacy and surveillance. This 
applies to the tracking of individuals and their information shadow online and offline (with 
forms of electronic surveillance in the city). Clearly, there are massive challenges in 
negotiating security and freedom, which are likely to play out in terms of access to the 
public sphere of cities, and to cultural expression. 
44
 Visit Britain (2014): china market and trade profile, January; National Statistics (1999) Travel Trends, a report on the 
1999 National Passenger survey; Visit Britain (2014) inbound tourism Trends Quarterly, 9.  
45
 Social Trends 40 (2014); The General Household Survey (2002) shows that just 12% of the population took part in 
arts activities in the last month. 
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A second theme that has been enabled by pervasive communications technologies has 
been coordination ‘on the go’ not linked to a building. The possibilities of temporary types 
of social gathering - the ‘festivalisation’ of temporary cultural events (from pop-up events 
to festivals) - is one example, another is the way that cities are becoming ‘stages’ for 
informal cultural activities that are ‘harvested’ by ‘trend spotters’ on city streets and fed 
back into the innovation process. Finally, the desire for experience, the qualities that the 
frequently atomised online life cannot provide, is likely to become an organising modality 
of cities as they respond to the online transformation. 
Governance 
There has been a significant shift in cultural values over the last half-century, represented 
by a turn away from the automatic acceptance of cultural values handed down by experts 
or those in authority. At the same time the breadth of what counts as culture has also 
widened; moreover, there has been a greater acceptance of what had been previously 
characterised as non-British and non-traditional cultural values and forms. Finally, the 
role of commercial culture has become far more pronounced; at the same time the 
implicit assumption that commercial culture will be inferior has diminished. These shifts in 
the cultural landscape present problems for policy makers as the object of policy making, 
and their audiences have changed. The rise of commercial cultural forms is in principle 
outside the purview of cultural policy. Thus, cultural policy has played ‘catch up’. 
As we have noted one of the biggest shifts in the balance has been to direct policy 
concern to commercial culture (usually in terms of the creative industries), and away from 
more traditional cultural forms. A second shift has been to change the accountability of 
cultural funding, increasingly it is an investment that has to yield social and economic 
benefits as well as cultural; urban regeneration being a case in point. In the process the 
‘arm’s length principle’, a buffer between political control of culture and its support, has 
become much weakened. Austerity has simply advanced these trends (Pratt and Hutton 
2013). 
In terms of the future, a key theme of cultural governance is instrumentalism, and ‘value 
for money’. It seems unlikely that ‘art for art’s sake’ will make a serious return in terms of 
state funding. A second theme is ‘who pays for culture?’; the advance of the ‘small state’ 
has not led to the disappearance of culture but to culture funded by a number of sources: 
corporate sponsorship, the state, individuals and volunteers46. 
A third theme is the spatial basis of cultural policies. A complex pincer movement has led 
to a reduction of central state funding for culture. However this funding tended to benefit 
national treasures, more than often located in London. The lottery has leveraged capital 
funding for many new regional museums; future sources of sustainable revenue funding 
will be the challenge. Cities and regions at present are receiving less money and are 
disinclined to invest in culture. One possibility is that regional fragmentation advances 
and cities receive tax-raising powers, or much increased autonomy. Tax raising powers 
could increase the cultural budget; they could also draw upon culture to establish identity 
in an environment of stronger place-based competition. 
One area that policy makers have begun to explore is the relationship of the cultural and 
creative economy to the rest of the economy, and to innovation. On one hand, this could 
46
 Despite the concerns of Putnam (2000) people in the UK are continuing to participate in community activities and to 
volunteer. Despite recession and government initiatives such as the ‘Big Society’, levels of volunteering have remained 
more or less stable over the last decade. Cabinet Office (2014).  
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be manifested as another form of instrumentalism; on the other hand it might lead to the 
exploration of different value systems that culture may offer, and thus be deemed worth 
of investment in its own right. 
De-industrialisation and the growth of London 
The final driver of change is that which relates to the UK urban system, this has a 
particular part to play in the understanding of the position of culture and cities. The de-
industrialisation that impacted UK cities in the 1970s and 1980s resulted in localised 
unemployment, and related social problems, as well as devastation of the urban fabric in 
inner urban locations.  
New employment growth eventually came from drawing in more women, and more part-
time workers into the workforce. The new jobs were not traditional manufacturing jobs, 
but retail and office jobs. London went through this cycle first, and emerged from the 
other side with net job growth but a transformed sectoral composition: manufacturing 
being replaced by financial services. Moreover, previous restrictions on office growth in 
London were relaxed and a disproportionate growth was concentrated in London. In the 
regions physical decay, and attendant social problems of unemployment, especially 
amongst the youth, gave rise to a particular instrumental inflection of policy for the 
creative industries where the balance of concern was in favour of the social impacts 
rather than the cultural or economic ones. Despite significant investment and job growth 
in regional cities, London, and the decline of mining and manufacturing shape the UK 
space economy.  
For the future even if new developments were evenly spread (per capita), the South East 
would enjoy significant advantages. The greater efficiencies due to past investment will 
continue this cumulative progress. In the cultural sector, which is structurally dominated 
by London, the process will be even more pronounced. This is going to be a profound 
challenge for cities outside London.  
The prospect of high-speed rail links such as HS2 could re-integrate the non-London 
conurbations, bringing them closer. However, the cultural system is structured, and not 
simply changed by proximity. As a result there is a danger that faster links will reinforce 
the centrality of London. In order to avoid this trend radical governance changes would 
be required that actively spatially redistribute and restructure the economic, cultural and 
governance system. 
In the absence of structural changes, cities have reverted to exogenous growth models 
for revival, using culture in place marketing to attract investment to cities. Increasingly, 
culture and identity have been used to differentiate cities for investors; this has been 
enabled by large-scale physical regeneration with flagship cultural investment. Given the 
other trends, it would be safe to assume that such a pattern will intensify rather than 
diminish. 
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The next 50 years: six scenarios 
In this section we will take the inheritance of the last 50 years, the emergent drivers of 
change and what we will identify as the themes of urbanisation that we are likely to 
experience. We present this as a range of scenarios based upon six ideal-type cities. We 
do not expect any one of these cities to be the model for the future, but rather that this 
range will point to the potential parameters for the role of culture in cities. The objective 
here is not to second-guess policy but rather to lay out potential consequences of longer 
term drivers and established trends that will result in a number of stylised challenges to 
direct future policy making. 
The underpinning factors are long-term, or slowly changing processes. For example, 
those of demography; here we know that the population will be increasingly aging, better 
educated, and multi-cultural. Leading on from this there will clearly continue to be an 
interest in culture, in fact all trends indicate that this will be more profound, and have a 
broader range. The precise manifestation of this demand will be contested.  
On one hand we can see a continuation, or even a revival, of a monoculture restricted to 
place based politics (city, region or nation); on the other hand, there is the rise of a 
cosmopolitan culturally omnivorous perspective comprising a politics of identity (culture 
as a resource to assert political abstractions47), and a politics of allocation.  A half-
century long transition away from a large state toward a small state can be identified in 
which cultural funding (public or private) has been deeply impacted. Culture increasingly 
has to be justified by reasons other than cultural value per se: instrumentalism, 
sponsorship, or the market.  
Accompanying a proliferation of cultural values and identities, there is the spectre of 
social and economic polarisation, and urban polarisation. This is manifest as the 
structural division of life changes, and the securitisation of a cultural commons and a 
collective city space is a marked trend. On the horizon there are other markers of 
division; the one likely to have most impact on the cultural field is that of the shifting 
balance of control over digital and intellectual property rights. In this sense, the options 
are between the city as an innovative, and diverse cultural commons, or, the city a 
cultural fortress protecting its unique assets from the sight of others under (digital) lock 
and key. 
The scenarios that follow have been generated from 2 x 5 matrix: the five themes already 
discussed, lying on a dualistic continuum. This is represented in Box F. Clearly there are 
many permutations possible; we have chosen six to highlight some potential challenging 
outcomes. The intention here is not to ‘predict’ a precise outcome(s), but to provide a 
range of possibilities and non-normative challenges which are, for presentational 
simplicity, presented as vectors of the future cultural dimensions of the city as a heuristic 
for policy making. 
47
 The classic statement on the construction of cultural traditions and claims to political nationalisms is Hobsbawm, E. 
and T. Ranger, Eds. (1992). The Invention of Tradition. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
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 Box F: The matrix of future cities and culture: topics and range 
 
a. Education/Training 
 Cultural spending, increasing debt 
b. Migration/Movement 
 Restrict immigration, selection by wealth, open immigration 
c. Technology 
 Dominance by technologies, mediation, cultural shaping of technologies 
d. Governance 
 Centralised planned, market demand, democratic culture, control of 
movement by technologies 
e. Space 
 Hierarchical urban system, fragmentation by city type, polarisation within 
cities 
 
 
Tourist-experience city 
The experience city will be organised for, and tailored to, an augmented reality of the 
city48. We can already see this in the practices of contemporary museum curation; if 
extended to a larger scale we might consider the city  providing an immersive 
experience, tailored to the visitor, complete with sensual feedback. It will not simply be a 
computer game, or a theme park, but a blending of the two with film special effects, and 
rooted in the unique physical environment and history of the city (Ashworth and 
Tunbridge 2000). It will blend the physical presence and virtual worlds: the physical 
setting will merge the streets, museums and galleries; as well as the sensual ambiance. 
This option is only likely to be available to a small number of cities due to the resource 
intensive nature of the project. 
The ‘back story’ is that such data rich environments will enable the more efficient 
management of people and experiences. These characteristics provide a limit for current 
‘tourist-historic’ and ‘cultural touristic' cities (Russo 2002, Russo and van der Borg 2002, 
Richards 2007). Thus the bottom line is to earn as much money through the total 
management envelope of the customer. By extending and merging retail trends, and 
experience, that is for the most invisible and willingly entered into by the user (by 
collecting uploading participants’ personal data). Cities will compete to provide a unique 
digital enhanced experience49. In this way cities may be able to square the circle of 
offering something unique and place specific, even when everything is reproducible, and 
reality is rendered banal. 
Appropriate experiences will be selected, programmed and tailored to individual needs; 
and associated with previous visits to this, and to other similarly ‘enhanced’ cities50. The 
data rich environment will enable not simply personal itineraries to be arranged, but will 
48
 Pine II, J. P. and J. H. Gilmore (1999). The Experience Economy: Work Is Theatre & Every Business a Stage. 
Harvard, Harvard Business School.work, and the writings of William Gibson and Neal Stephenson, as well as the 
environment of role playing computer games such as Assassin’s Creed. 
49
 A digital extension of the notion of ‘creative tourism’ Richards, G. and L. Marques "Exploring Creative Tourism: 
Editors Introduction." Journal of Tourism Consumption and Practice 4(2): 1-11. 
50
 This is an extension of challenge that historic, heritage and tourist cities seek to achieve supply management: 
managing access to particular facilities and directing users to others where there could be overcrowding. Here this can 
be done in real time, and interpolated with demand management as well. 
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be shaped to most efficiently manage resources. In so doing, queuing and congestion will 
be minimised, and ‘wear and tear’ can be balanced and resources will be used to 
maximum capacity. This will allow previously unachievable people management; real 
time rescheduling can also take place.  The visitor experience will be further enhanced by 
tailored hotel, catering and transit arrangements - allowing the visiting of the maximum 
number of visit sites in any allocated period. The interactive personal profiling will enable 
the city to minimise any adverse ‘shocks’, and maximise the positive ones. Thus, the 
cultural offer will be moulded precisely to consumer demand. 
It could be argued that this model is resilient and sustainable too; the common challenge 
with ‘entertainment environments’ is that visitors quickly tire of particular novelties, and 
demand more; hence they have to be constantly rebuilt. In the tourist-experience city, the 
software and hardware experiences always can be upgraded and thereby seamlessly re-
purpose the interface, the infrastructure, and the experience. 
A potential consequence is that access to the city will be controlled on the basis of ability 
to pay, and the willingness to forfeit their (meta-) data rights which will themselves be 
traded (Andrejevic 2013). The ‘site’ will need to be secured, and made exclusive to 
paying visitors. These city ‘total environments’ will require a significant number of people 
(who are cheaper than avatars) to ‘service’ them. These ‘characters’ who will bring life to 
the city and interpret it through interactions will be enabled by ‘just in time’ information 
and identifiers for tourists (this will minimise training of ‘guides’), maximise appropriate 
engagement, and provide simple disciplinary metrics to be applied to the guides. The 
workers, that is the guides, managers, cleaners and ancillaries, will be domiciled in their 
own areas (Edge Cities) so as not to disrupt the visitor experience. 
Homeland city 
The  ‘homeland city’ will offer the security and containment of the past, and be occupied 
by mainly those over 50 (of which there will be considerable demand due to demographic 
shifts). They are inspired by trends in New Urbanism especially in the US51 (Bray 1993, 
Beauregard 2002, White and Ellis 2007), as well as UK social and political shifts. A key 
management theme of these cities will be the preservation of ‘traditional’ values, they will 
be the (pre-) retirement oases for those that do not seek, and wish to be protected from, 
anything that challenges their value system. In terms of location they will be the likely 
future of the larger market towns, and in particular the seaside resorts of the UK. 
Access to these cities will be limited to those that can invest their pensions and savings 
with the management company who will also provide comprehensive medical and 
nursing care as the need arises. Those under 50 will be restricted from visiting except at 
weekends and public holidays, however if they sign up to abide by the rules they may be 
allowed temporary residence permits. Planning and building controls will be strictly 
enforced, as well aesthetic controls on gardens; community councils will implement this. 
Of course, workers will be required in this city; most will come from the community itself, 
as retirement ages continue to rise. More youthful employees will, when not on duty, be 
required to live outside the town, and observe the curfew. Some towns will have a 
nationality test, restricting access for all immigrants. 
The range of cultural offerings in these cities will be particularly strong; the collective 
investment will favour an active cultural programme based upon musicals and light 
51
 As well as films such as the Truman Show, and to a lesser extent Sim City (although we anticipate a new version: 
‘the older years’. 
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music, and history; the focus will be culturally conservative and the middlebrow. There 
will be ample provision of golf courses and bowling greens. Public transport52 provision 
will also be free and regular; private car ownership will be low and volunteer work high. 
The towns will be linked to substantial hospitals that will specialise in care services for 
the elderly; and most likely there will be a linked investment of the town management 
resources and the hospital. These towns will be disconnected from the mainstream, by 
choice. 
Campus city 
The notion of the campus city derives from that of science cities and technological hubs 
(Castells and Hall 1993) and smart cities (Great Britain. Office of and Technology 1999, 
Campbell 2012, Townsend 2013), as well as corporate technology environments such as 
those of Google and Apple53, and the notion of the creative class (Florida 2002). Despite 
the name, universities will play a role instrumental to the corporate demands in this city. 
In the campus city, culture and education is purely for instrumental purposes, supporting 
the city to the extent that scientific performance (likewise health, sport and recreation) in 
enhanced. Workers will be encouraged to ‘live in’; but those that do not will have 
dedicated transit means to ferry them to work (see below). To counter the otherwise 
atomistic and utilitarian nature of life social relationships will be built into this model of 
urban life, they will be pro-social, and workers will be required to help others and support 
creative initiatives. These meetings will be totally open and data porous zones; seminars 
and meetings, and post-work socialisation will be continuous. Cultural resources will be 
needed to ‘oil the wheels’ of this community, but not to distract it. Entry to the city will be 
completely inclusive, as long as visitors achieve a particular IQ score.  
The city will be based in a well-landscaped and secure ‘campus’ setting. Universities will 
be included as economic, scientific and cultural incubators; however, student numbers at 
these facilities will be regulated  based on jobs available. The focus on research and 
development, as well as curricula scope, as well as the organisation of the city everyday 
life, will be planned to have the most impact as judged by a tie-up between hi-tech 
companies, universities and city authorities. This will be a ‘total learning environment’. So 
much so that workers will be encouraged to be the Guinea pigs for their own 
experiments, and new forms of urban living, and cultural consumption, will develop from 
the interface of the instrumented city and the university.  
Little traditional governance will take place, as provision of services will be governed by 
feedback from human-implanted apps, which will work in a two-way mode, offering 
feedback on service levels, as well as ‘advice’ about health and pro-social activities. This 
system will allow the abolition of money, as the implanted chip will monitor and co-
ordinate spending and reward (based on a range of metrics). These will be the first cities 
and towns to only accept driverless cars, which will allow the cities to sprawl over 
increasingly larger areas, however time will be used productively whilst commuting. This 
transit will provide a useful way to bring in service workers from the Edge City, as they 
will not be permitted, or able to afford to be resident, in the campus city. 
Funding of culture will be in terms of generous sponsorship from corporate and high-tech 
bodies. The priorities and instrumented capabilities will obviate state structures. As part 
52
 Although perhaps more likely ‘subscription’ would be a better term, as the urban provision is likely to be - in effect - 
uncoupled from state financing. 
53
 See especially Eggers, D. (2013). The Circle. London, Hamish Hamilton. 
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of the contractual settlement of citizenship creators and authors, all those that cooperate 
with the campus city will be required to accept that all intellectual property rights are 
ceded to the corporations’ “common wealth”, in perpetuity. 
Business Lounge City 
The business lounge city is based upon ideas developed about the 'dual city’ (Mollenkopf 
and Castells 1991)/ ‘polarised city’ (Sassen 2001), and the 'Transnational capitalist class’ 
(Sklair 2001), and the growth of gated communities (Atkinson and Flint 2004); moreover, 
the emergence of ‘linear environments’ that exclusive groups can ‘edit’ their interactions 
with the world (the business lounge and the gated community being exemplars). This city 
form is one in which those rich enough, and with access rights, will be fully catered for 
and charged to the corporate bill. They will sustain high culture, with the best 
performances, in trophy concert halls sponsored by the same corporate donors; there will 
be access to elite sporting event as well on the same terms. Culture is as much about the 
display and environment as about practice and engagement. 
These locations, and specifically the office space, will become the repositories of much of 
the world’s art, as these institutions ‘decorate’ their facilities with high culture to maintain 
a symbolic representation of trust and solidity, as well as a way of spreading the risk in 
their portfolio of investments. 
Such cities will have an exclusive eating and drinking quarter that will be tailored to the 
wishes of this elite group; they will provide discrete privacy and exclusive opportunities. 
Busy executives keen to maintain their own portfolio of education and knowledge will rely 
upon a peripatetic force of education professionals to update them on key topics, but also 
to deliver and arrange personal lectures on any subject; there will be a tie up between 
leading arts and humanities university faculties to provide this info-tainment.  
Movement through the city will be via a number of special transit lanes, which will 
effectively join one part of the gated city to another, and bypass ordinary traffic; where 
this is not possible, roads will be reserved for this community. Safety and security, as well 
as protection from outsiders will be paramount. Whilst shopping for most will be an online 
experience, in the Business lounge city shopping will be re-invented as a personal 
shopping experience, with a personal shopper and shops opened specifically for this 
purpose, for those otherwise lacking the time or imagination. Likewise, unique cultural 
experiences will be created for the high-end traveller, and specific access rights, and a 
personal introduction and tour, of museums and their archives. 
Infrastructure facilities will be provided and supported by the Business lounge cities, in 
the hope and expectation that they will retain corporate decision makers and the 
associated investment. Corporate donors will compete with one another to demonstrate 
their association with elite cultural values54.  As with the other ideal-type cities the elite 
with will require a large number of workers to provide the personal services on a 24/7 
basis; but these workers will not be able to live in the city due to costs and access, they 
will reside in the Edge City. 
 
 
54
 In this case the particular cultural values are irrelevant, as long as they are symbolic of elite culture and aesthetics 
(and thus individual art works may not be conservative, but radical). 
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The Omnivore City 
The Omnivore City will be the domicile of the upper-middle classes, the educated, but not 
corporate. It will position itself in contradistinction to the social and cultural polarisation 
and atomisation of knowledge, and the focus on consumption of other cities. It will stress 
democracy and involvement in decision making, using creative solutions to urban 
problems, and reaping the benefits from inter-culturalism (Landry 2000, Wood and 
Landry 2007).  
These cities will be tailored to accommodate a fast changing cosmopolitan culture - world 
culture, based on the mobility of people and ideas. In many respects this will embody the 
‘open city’ of ‘open innovation’ (Chesbrough 2003). However, in line with the ethos of this 
city it will not be aligned to the needs of corporate culture (Ferrary 2011).  Rather than 
dictating cultural norms, the objective will be to encourage and celebrate the 
smorgasbord of ideas and practices.  This agora of knowledge will be further promoted 
by a culture of interaction, in organisational and physical terms. The ideal citizen of this 
city is the ‘cultural omnivore’ (Peterson and Kern 1996). 
By its nature this will be high-density, socially networked city55, one that engineers 
meeting of people as both consumers and producers (all will be both) in numerous face-
to-face networking arrangements. Co-working spaces, multiple-occupation buildings will 
be the norm. This will be high-touch, high-interaction city environment. However, it is 
unlikely that the omnivore city will be able to compete for land values56 with corporate 
interests.  
Even from this relatively privileged  group, many will be unable to afford studio and living 
space in the old cities. For this reason, the omnivore cities will in effect grow up in the ‘old 
suburbs’, which will have been in disfavour from the new satellite, and new inner city on 
one hand, and the edge cities of the majority. Whilst inner-city meeting will be important, 
it will be increasingly difficult. This is why the characteristic form of the omnivore city will 
be studio networking in the suburbs, a form of lateral and multi-nodal networking of 
studio/homeworkers. The reason that the older suburbs will be important is that housing 
space standards provide are more appropriate. These spaces are likely to be on the 
inner edges of the conurbations, and satellite ‘cultural hot spots’57. 
Edge City 
Perhaps the most highly populated, but least ‘cultured’, urban form will be the Edge City; 
its workers will ‘service’ most of the other city forms; it will be ubiquitous ‘back stage’ 
presence in all cities. The notion of Edge City is one of not simply urban sprawl but a 
continuous poly-nucleated, and non-focal urbanism (Garreau 1991, Sudjic 1991). In 
cultural terms when compounded with economic and social polarisation, and small 
government, this will result in what is in many respects a cultural wasteland. Cities will be 
functional dormitories with transport links sponsored by corporate urban interests. Due to 
low pay, and the low tax base, few ‘public services’ will be provided. Moreover, such 
55
 Globally and locally networked 
56
 Not because the culture and knowledge is unimportant, rather the fact that it is not in private ownership, and its value 
is amortized in the future. 
57
 For example Leamington Spa, Brighton and Dundee. See Pratt, A. C., R. C. Gill and V. Spelthann (2007). "Work and 
the city in the e-society: A critical investigation of the socio-spatially situated character of economic production in the 
digital content industries, UK." Information, Communication & Society 10(6): 921-941. 
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services would be more expensive to provide in such a dispersed form. Thus, it is also 
likely that there will be little support for additional taxation to sustain cultural facilities.  
Shopping will have migrated online, obviating the need for shops. In these Edge Cities it 
will be far too expensive for companies to offer personal deliveries, they will retreat to 
‘drop offs’. However, these spaces will emerge as informal ‘culture hubs’. They will be the 
places at which people will self-organise their own entertainment. Aside from the 
Omnivore City, this is likely to be the only place where cultural producers (formally or 
informally) will be able to remain in ownership (even if they choose not to exercise it) of 
producers. It is likely that a new culture of live and ‘offline’ activities will grow up that 
provide both a cultural space for artists and cultural workers, and provide a means by 
which that can make money from their art outside the corporate realm58. This will have 
another manifestation in the nomadic cultural communities that will be an analogue of 
‘touring’; these cultural producers will establish temporary festivals/ cities and move from 
one edge zone to another seeking to maintain autonomy and creative freedom. 
58
 If they produced work ‘at work’ they would have no rights over it. 
32 
                                            
Conclusions 
The aim of this paper has been to offer insights into the future cultural dimension of cities 
in the UK in the period up to 2064. The review identified and tracked the key trends and 
processes over the period 1964 to the present; this revealed a paradigm shift had taken 
place in the conception and practice of culture, and the relationship of culture to cities. 
The objective is not to predict future trends, but rather to highlight potential trends and 
tendencies that will enable policy makers to understand that nature of changes respond 
appropriately.  
In terms of an overview of the dimensions of change that have shaped the cultural 
dimension of cities we can highlight five points: 
a. The way that culture is financed: shifting from a state to a third sector and private 
role; 
b. The influence of culture on social life: shifting from a ‘special’ to ‘ordinary’, culture is 
more pervasive; 
c. The influence on economic life: a significant growth in the commercial aspects of 
cultural provision, and its influence on cultural values; 
d. The diversity of cultural expression: inclusion of a breath of cultural expressions from 
other parts of the world, from informal activities, what was previously regarded as low 
culture; 
e. The delivery of culture: increasingly via a succession of new technologies that allow 
choice of time and place, and choice of cultural participation. 
These five shifts have been reflected in the struggle of the policy community and 
academics to fashion inclusive definitions and concepts that reflect practice. These 
changes have also provoked profound challenges as to how to regulate and govern the 
field of culture.  
The changes in cultural practice have been woven with a significant change in the 
character of urbanisation and city life, marked by de-industrialisation, and the growth of 
the service economy. In turn there have been changes in the positioning of cities in their 
regions and the world; international flows of money and ideas, and people is increasingly 
the norm. However, these shifts have marked cities with new forms of social and 
economic, and cultural division that can be summarised in three points: 
a. The balance between elites and the rest, the access to the urban ‘commons’: cities 
have become more segmented and exclusive; 
b. The balance between public and private cultural values, notably the emphasis of 
commercial values and consumption: cities increasingly view culture in an 
instrumental light (attracting investment, tourism, and new experiences); 
c. The role of the economic: previously the economic dimensions of culture were 
considered minor, now they are taking a major role. In contrast to the instrumental 
role, this is a productive role characterised by a focus on the creative industries, and 
cultural quarters. 
33 
Clearly the future will be different from the past; it is not helpful to focus on a particular 
technology, or cultural practice in thinking about the future. We have identified the drivers 
and their likely dimensions, and as summarised above the vectors of change. This 
presents us with a unique perspective from which to view the character of governance 
challenges that will characterise the next fifty years of culture and cities. A strand that 
runs through all of these points concerns the balance between the public and the private 
realm: this debate reoccurs with respect to technology, economics, social and spatial 
fields, and is different for each cultural practice.  
Cities are potentially cultural powerhouses, but such energy has to be managed, curated, 
and not dictated. This process must involve insight into the actions and the 
consequences of cultural practice. At present there is a weak academic, and policy, 
foundation, a lagging and insufficient empirical database. As with all fast changing and 
innovative fields, investment in research and understanding will pay dividends in future 
problem avoidance, and the fulfilment of potential. 
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